In the 7 days to September 21, 2026, 9.09% of tracked Base DEX volume routed through contracts that no public label, no registry, and none of our own forensic passes can tie to a named origin. A week earlier that figure was $559.60M, at 11.00%. Read the two numbers together before reading either one: the share fell by a point while the dollars rose by $34M, because tracked volume grew from $5.09B to $5.95B. We shipped no new labels between these two windows, so the fall is the denominator and not us. A further 18.2% of the window, $1,083.4M, resolves to an operator, a governing Safe, or a role such as an arbitrage bot, and none of that is a frontend either. On the strict reading, volume tied to nothing at all, the figure is 27.31%, against 27.72% a week earlier. In total, we identified $597M of it, across seven contracts, every one of them previously at the top of this page's open list. Here is what we found, how, and what is still open.
ClearTrace attributes DEX volume to the party that actually sent it, using four independent vectors: calldata-suffix trapping, proxy-router tracing (where the transaction target is not the venue), multi-hop origin tracing, and fee-recipient attribution, backed by a forensic labeling pipeline (verified-source lookups across four chains, deployer attribution, bytecode and behavioral fingerprints). On Base that resolves 90.91% of tracked volume to a named origin: frontends, aggregators, market-maker desks, MEV bots, vault systems, and the operators and governing Safes behind contracts that carry no brand.
"Unattributed" is the residue, counted strictly. It includes contracts our own pipeline has examined and explicitly failed to identify; on July 30, 2026 we corrected our coverage metric because those "manual review" placeholders had been counted on the attributed side, which had flattered the number. Everything named below has been through the full forensic pipeline. Where we could not name it, we say so.
A named origin is not always a frontend, and this version of the note says so in
numbers. Of the 90.91% we attribute, 18.2% of the window ($1,083.4M) resolves to an
operator address, a governing Safe, or a role: an arbitrage bot, a vault executor, a liquidity
manager. That is a real identification of who runs the contract or what it does, and it is what
the seven contracts below are. It is not a product anyone could name. Counting that volume as
unplaced, the way an earlier version of this note's definition implied, the figure is 27.31%
of the window, against 27.72% a week earlier. It fell by four tenths of a point, and that is the
honest size of the move. We applied no labels of our own between these two windows, which we can
say precisely because the label file has exactly one commit in that span and it lands after this
window closed. The September 15 pass that produced the last
version's shift is now two windows back; its figures, $385.6M across seven contracts, were
measured in the window then current and are left at those values because they describe what that
pass moved, not what those contracts trade today. Five of them are not profiled here:
0x7cd2ce5e… (MEV/Arbitrage Bot), 0x215199f6… (Batch
Transfer Helper), 0xb3aed72d… and 0x4e2aec3b… (Tokenized
Equity Market Maker), and 0xe6b82c6e… (a named PancakeSwap order
reactor that landed on the frontend side, not this bucket). We publish both figures because they
answer different questions. If you are asking what volume this version of the pipeline cannot
characterise at all, read 9.09%. If you are asking what volume has not been tied to any name,
including a bucket name, read 27.31%.
Dune's own dex.trades resolver reports $5.95B of raw tracked volume for this
window, and every figure on this page is computed on all of it. An earlier version of this note
excluded two contracts the resolver itself named FakeHook, at $1,786.5M carried in
a single transaction apiece, a pricing artifact rather than real trading. Those rows fall
outside the 7 days to September 21, 2026, so there is no exclusion left to make and no
ex-outlier basis to state: we report $5.95B as tracked volume, and raw tracked volume is the
same number. Both this window and the one before it are stated on the same all-in basis.
It is tracked volume, not the chain's total. Our $5.95B is 90.6% of DefiLlama's $6.56B for Base over the same window. We are still under it, but much less so: the previous window read 77.0%, the one before that 82.4%, and older windows ran at 140% and 111% of DefiLlama. That is a 13.6-point swing in one week in a ratio nothing on this page controls, which is the warning itself: these are different measurements of the same chain, taken from different source data, and the gap between them moves by more in a week than any figure on this page. We went looking for a double-count when the ratio ran high and did not find one; every transaction is collapsed to a single notional before any volume is summed, and the excess was already present in the raw per-leg source data before our pipeline touched it. What we have not done is re-localize the gap in either direction. So read every percentage here against our tracked set, not against Base as a whole.
More than four tenths of it is bots. 42.55% of the denominator is MEV and arbitrage flow, which has no frontend by construction, and that share rose from 39.59% in the previous window. So the 90.91% we attribute should not be read as 90.91% being apps. Most of what we resolve is bots, desks, and routers behaving exactly as expected. The unattributed slice is the part nobody can place at all.
The seven contracts below were at the top of this page's open list when we named them: five in the week to August 17, 2026, and two more on September 15, 2026, both of which the previous version of this note carried as open. The volumes shown are their volume in the current window. None of them is a company name, because none of them resolves to one: the evidence supports an operator and an architecture, not an identity, which is why these read as descriptions rather than brands. The forensic readings in this section were taken on the window ending September 8, 2026 and are dated where they rest on a measurement; the identifications do not depend on the window.
Now: Anonymous Vault Router (Safe 0xe296…5658). This is the contract the first version of this note led with, the one deployed at the same address on four chains that every entity database came back empty on. The reason every proxy lookup failed is that it stores its implementation in a custom storage slot rather than the EIP-1967 slot, so standard tooling reads nothing there. Reading that slot directly exposes a ~20KB implementation whose revert strings ("Bot address not whitelisted", "Not proxy owner and not whitelisted") match an already-labeled sibling cluster, and the governing Gnosis Safe is a hardcoded immutable in the runtime. Its callers are the cluster's own whitelisted bot fleet, not public users. Held unnamed by three prior runs, until a non-standard storage slot was checked.
Now: Anonymous Execution Proxy (operator 0xb045…7adb). Not identifiable
on its own, and it had been skipped by an earlier pass as too thin to judge. It became legible
as a fleet: 22 contracts on Base sharing one identical 680-byte runtime, all deployed
by the same automated EOA, and all returning that same EOA from owner(). A
per-user smart-wallet product would set the owner to each user; one owner across 22 contracts
is one operator. This member carries 74% of the fleet's volume. We first wrote this up as
private automated trading and had to correct ourselves hours later: it is running the
Aerodrome liquidity strategy described below, which we only saw once we started reading
position NFTs.
Now: MEV/Arbitrage Bot. Briefly the largest unattributed contract on Base
once the two above were named. Its code is unverified, but it keeps its revert strings, and
they settle the question: MIN_PROFIT, POOL_FLASH_FAILED,
NO_CALLBACK_ADAPTER, TAIL_NOT_AFTER_LOOP. A profit floor enforced in
the contract, a flash-loan callback and a cyclic route is the standard arbitrage design. The
traffic agrees: across all 17,122 transactions in the window there is exactly one function
selector, 95.6% of the calls revert, and 137 distinct unnamed EOAs drive it,
the busiest 16 of them carrying 73.5% of the traffic. No frontend reverts nineteen of every
twenty of its users' swaps for failing to clear a profit threshold.
Now: Anonymous Aerodrome LP Manager (operator 0x6c22…f64f). Nothing in
its own bytecode names it: it is a 352-byte proxy over an unverified implementation whose only
readable strings are about transferring gas. What names it is what it holds. Every
NFT it receives is minted by one contract, and that contract's metadata reads "Slipstream
Position NFT v1", symbol AERO-CL-POS: an Aerodrome concentrated-liquidity
position. AERO arrives 233 times and leaves 5, which is what harvested emissions look like.
It holds none of those positions. All 8,495 that passed through it in the
window were minted, staked into an Aerodrome CLGauge, withdrawn and burned, and
not one is still held. That is a two-transaction cycle rather than the single transaction we
first reported, and the gauge leg is where the harvested emissions come from.
Now: Anonymous Aerodrome LP Manager (factory 0x6694…a8a0). The same
business, run the opposite way: it holds 184 Slipstream positions rather than cycling them.
Its revert strings are all namespaced LST: and are pure position mechanics
(LST: invalid quoter, LST: rebalance failed, LST: Token
already exists for this pool+tick). It is deployed by a factory rather than by a
person, which is what a product looks like rather than a private fleet. We cannot tell you
what LST stands for.
Now: Anonymous Vault Swap Executor (multi-DEX). Named September 15, 2026.
The previous version of this note carried this contract as open and characterised it as a
vault-gated arbitrage router driven by a whitelisted EOA fleet, from its revert strings and its
74% revert rate. An earlier pass had called it opaque. It is not: its 8,688-byte runtime reads
directly. The only permitted caller is a vault whose identity
is checked against a stored value (Only Vault can call this function,
Mismatch between provided vault and contract vault), enforced at three separate
caller-check sites in the bytecode. The venue surface is what settles the multi-DEX part: the
external ABI carries five distinct V3-fork swap callbacks, for Uniswap, PancakeSwap, Algebra,
Ramses and Hyperswap, plus an admin-curated pool registry. That is an executor built to be
driven by one vault across several venues. Whose vault is still not established, and that is
why the name is a description.
Now: Anonymous Execution Router (operator 0xbdb6…0e60). Named September 15, 2026. A router, not a bot and not an unattributed venue: our own router-entry data already carried it as a routing address at $111.3M across 43,284 legs, and an earlier version of this note had found its owner, the same EOA that owns the signature-gated executor further down. What settled the architecture was reading the deployer's nonce. It stands at 5,906, which means 5,905 contract creations, and the children can be derived from that nonce alone and checked on chain. Every one is a 129-byte call-forwarder with an identical code hash: it checks that the caller is this factory, reads a target address from the first twenty bytes of calldata, and forwards the rest. Thousands of disposable forwarders behind one owner-operated router is a fleet, and the operator is the address that owns it.
Three claims here were measured on a sample rather than across the window: this section's MEV contract, from 300 transactions; the Aerodrome manager's position cycle, from 200 NFTs; and the vault-gated router's absence of ERC-20 transfers, further down. We have re-run all three over the whole window. The router's held exactly, at zero transfers in or out. The Aerodrome cycle held in its conclusion, that the contract keeps none of the positions, but not in its mechanism, and is restated above. The MEV contract's did not hold: 300 transactions out of 17,122 gave 75% reverts and 16 senders, where the full window gives 95.6% and 137. That sample was not unlucky. The contract's traffic is concentrated enough that its busiest 16 senders carry 73.5% of it, so a small draw sees those senders and few others, and a rate computed from the same draw carries the same bias. No identification and no dollar figure changes. What does change is that a sampled figure should not have been set beside measured ones without saying which it was.
$540.85M is spread across 5,922 contracts, only 66 of which moved more than $1M; the largest is 17.03% of the pool and the top ten together are 55.06%. The median open contract moved about $4,494.
The head of this pool did not move, and the shares above still rose. At the
previous label date the same paragraph read $593.60M across 5,935 contracts, with the largest at
15.51% and the top ten at 50.92%. Since then 13 contracts left the pool carrying $52.76M between
them, and every one of them resolved to the same thing: an automated trading contract operated by
a single address, 0xca41…cc0b. None of the 13 was in the top three. The
largest open contract is the same contract holding the same $92.09M it held before, and the top
three still hold $199.16M between them; only the pool they are measured against got smaller. So
read the two share figures as arithmetic rather than as a finding — a rising share with a
stationary numerator is a denominator story.
That also retires the reading the previous version of this paragraph led with. It called deconcentration "the clearest thing on this page", on the strength of the head's share falling two weeks running. It has now reversed without the head trading differently at all, which is the tell that the earlier run was measuring the same effect in the opposite direction: contracts entering and leaving a denominator, not a market redistributing. We are not replacing it with the opposite claim. On this evidence the concentration of the open pool is not a trend in either direction, and we will not describe it as one again until the head itself moves.
The head of the list changed order. 0x4a8c4de8… has
overtaken 0xf7360bda… and is now the largest open contract at $92.1M against
$82.0M. The head of this pool has changed before, but by a contract being named and leaving;
this is the first time we have recorded one overtaking another on volume alone. Behind
them, two contracts we had not profiled before are now third and fourth,
0xd0849fed… at $25.0M and 0xf66e940d… at $22.4M. Both
were examined in the September 22 pass and neither could be named; they are described in the
forward note below rather than profiled here, because a characterisation we could not finish is
not a profile.
The seven are identifications: an operator and an architecture, each resting on evidence that survived a check designed to break it. The contracts below are one step short. We can say what they behave like and rule things out, but nothing here ties any of them to a product, a desk or a person, so none of them has left the open pool and none is counted in the $464M.
Corrected 2026-09-08; measurements below are from the window ending September 8,
2026 and have not been re-run on this one. Volume has fallen for a second week,
$150.1M to $99.1M to $82.0M, and it is no longer the largest open contract:
0x4a8c4de8… below has overtaken it. The original entry called this "an owner-operated router on Uniswap v4, and
the first head-of-pool contract here that does not look like a bot," and rested that on
roughly eight thousand distinct senders and a revert rate of zero. Both supports have failed.
The senders are not independent of each other, and the revert rate was never zero. The volume
figure, the counterparties and the bytecode readings are unchanged and are restated below.
Now: a wallet fleet trading against a float the contract owns. The callers
never pay. Across 331,517 swap calls in the seven days to September
8, the number in which the caller attached any ETH is zero. On a buy the contract
sends WETH to the UniversalRouter and the token lands with the caller; on a sell
the caller sends the token and the WETH comes back to the contract. A router spends the
caller's money. This one spends its own, in both directions, every time.
Nor are the senders a population. We took the three thousand busiest and traced the first
funding each had ever received: they resolve to seven addresses, and the
seventh is 0x1ca0…e18e, this contract's own owner(). The
median seed is 0.00015 ETH, paid once, which is gas and not stake. The
trading capital never leaves the contract, and 86.5% of the swaps are round trips:
the same wallet buying and then selling the same token, 7,206 wallets doing it, median holding
time 56 minutes. Every swap call is 484 bytes exactly, a single hop at fee = 100
and tickSpacing = 1, the cheapest tier on v4, with those same parameters across
all 178 tokens it touched.
The counterparty picture stands as first published. Its only ERC-20 counterparties are
Uniswap's own infrastructure: inbound transfers are WETH from the v4 PoolManager,
outbound ones are WETH to the UniversalRouter, both verified under those names on
Base, and nothing else appears, which is what v4 flash accounting looks like from outside. So
do the bytecode readings. Its 18,614 bytes are unverified but keep their strings:
UniswapV2Library: IDENTICAL_ADDR, Ownable: caller is not the owner,
and tokenOut not allowed. owner() and storage slot 0 both return the
same EOA, which also deployed it.
The revert figure was wrong. We published "none of them reverted." The same window holds 1,443 reverts against 332,293 transactions, a rate of 0.434%, and no single day since this contract's first transaction on August 25 has been clean; the daily rate runs between 0.042% and 1.279%. The contrast the original paragraph drew still holds in direction: 0.434% against the 95.6% revert rate on this page's MEV bot, named above, is a different kind of machine, but it is a low revert rate and not an absent one. We did not measure the reverts before publishing the zero. That is the same fault as reading an unmeasured signal as a real one, which is a fault this pipeline has had before.
What we are not saying. Not whose fleet this is, and not why it runs. Round trips against your own float serve several ends, some of them ordinary, and nothing here separates them or establishes intent. We are also not saying the $150.1M measured that week (now $82.0M) is fictitious: the swaps executed, the pools moved, and the volume sat in the tracked total, which is why it belonged in this pool rather than outside it. The narrower claim is the one we are confident of, that a sender count assembled this way carries no evidence about users and cannot support the reading we gave it. What would settle it: whether the six funders above the fleet answer to one desk or to several, which is a question about their own funding chain and not about this contract. The three vectors we said would settle it last time, a calldata suffix, a fee recipient, or a referral tag, have now been checked across every call in the window and none of them exists.
Out of the pool entirely: $104.5M two windows ago, $3.3M in the last one, and
nothing at all in this one. The
characterisation below was measured on the window ending September 8, 2026 and stands as a
description of what the contract is; the volume no longer does. Its sibling under the same
owner, 0xa654a1c8…, has since been named above.
Then: signature-gated executor, one operator, two contracts. 41,867
transactions from 4,204 distinct senders through exactly
one function selector, with 44% reverting. Thousands of senders crowding a
single entrypoint and losing half the time is a race, not a product; nobody ships a consumer
flow that fails every other attempt. Its 10,786 bytes carry
\x19Ethereum Signed Message:, so the entrypoint verifies an off-chain
signature before it will act.
Its counterparties are 22 addresses in each direction across USDC, WETH and cbBTC, and one
of them is Morpho, verified under that name. A signature-gated single
entrypoint racing against a lending protocol is the shape of liquidation or a similar
time-sensitive strategy, and the asset mix fits. owner() returns the EOA
0xbdb6…0e60, which also owns
0xa654a1c821f7604b5500a2fe8de67a737497d10d, which was ninth in the open pool at
$18.1M a week when this was written and is now named above at $121.7M. Different bytecode, same
owner: one operator, two contracts, and the router half is no longer open.
What we are not saying. Not that it is liquidating Morpho positions; a lending protocol among a contract's counterparties is not proof of what it does there. What would settle it: decoding that one selector, and checking whether the reverts cluster on the same block as someone else's success, which is what losing a race looks like and what ordinary failure does not.
What we know: this is now the largest open contract on Base, up from
$75.6M. Unverified, ~9.1KB of bytecode. Executes Seaport-style
fulfillBasicOrder settlement calls alongside its DEX activity. Holds an inventory
of airdropped spam tokens, which pollutes behavioral fingerprinting. No deployer attribution.
Volume is real routed DEX flow, not transfer noise.
Dossiered on September 22, for the first time. Two earlier passes skipped
it without spending the budget on a full forensic profile. The profile came back with nothing
to hold: no deployer attribution, no visible funders, zero named counterparties, no standard
read interface, and a selector hint of balanceOf and nothing else. Its volume
rose while its evidence did not. We are recording the dossier path as exhausted for this
address so the next pass does not spend on it again; what is left is a status-carrying query
over the chain's own transaction table, which is a different instrument.
What we know: was third-largest when it entered this list at $24.0M and has fallen to $13.4M, which puts it below the two contracts now sitting third and fourth. Still unexamined. No characterisation is offered and no attribution claim is made; it is here so the head of the pool is stated in full.
What we know: listed three versions ago as the second-largest open contract. It has kept falling, $5.3M in the last window and $0.2M in this one, and is nowhere near the head of the pool. Still unexamined, and no attribution claim is made.
All figures are tracked DEX volume over the 7 days ending September 21, 2026, with attribution labels as of September 23, 2026. Attribution volume refreshes on the Monday sync, so the volume window and the label date are stated separately. Updated 2026-09-24, labels only. The volume window is unchanged: this is the same 7 days to September 21, 2026, over the same $5.95B of tracked volume, and the attribution table behind it has not been re-fetched. What moved is the label layer. The 2026-09-23 sync re-resolved contract names against forensic labelling work, and 13 Base contracts holding $52.76M left the unattributed pool — all 13 to one operator's automated trading fleet. So the unattributed slice reads $540.85M and 9.09%, against $593.60M and 9.98% at the previous label date, and the operator-or-role slice absorbs exactly what the unattributed slice lost, rising to $1,083.4M and 18.2%.
The strict figure did not move at all, and that is the point. Counting operator and role names as unplaced, it reads 27.31% — the same 27.31% as before, $1,624.21M against $1,624.20M. Nothing was placed this week. $52.76M moved from "no name at all" to "an operator we can point to", which is a real forensic result and is still not a product anyone could name. A reader watching only the headline would see $52.76M of progress that the page's own stricter definition says did not happen. No definition changed in this version.
The prior version of this note, dated 2026-09-22, covered the week to September 14, 2026, where the unattributed slice read $559.60M of $5.09B, or 11.00%, across 4,491 contracts, and the strict figure read 27.72%. Tracked volume then rose to $5.95B and the unattributed slice rose with it, to $593.60M across 5,935 contracts, while the published percentage fell to 9.98% — a denominator effect, with no labels of ours applied in between.
Growth-number integrity. When a chain, a grants program, or an incentive campaign reports DEX volume, the unattributable slice is the part no reviewer can classify as organic or bot. On Base that slice is $540.85M a week. You cannot say what incentives bought until you can say who sent the volume.
Unknown winners. Not every unknown is a bot. Of the seven we named here, at least two, a vault-gated router and a labeled MEV bot, read as arbitrage on their own evidence; the rest read as infrastructure a product could be built on. Some of the volume we have resolved on Base traced back to real products, including a major exchange's aggregator router that carried tens of millions before it was labeled. A contract quietly moving eight figures a week might be extraction, or it might be infrastructure for an app succeeding on your chain that no ecosystem team has on its radar.
If you can tie any of these contracts to a frontend, app, desk, or bot operator, or you know someone who can, I want to hear from you: andrew@cleartracedata.com. Verified labels go into the open attribution dataset with credit if you want it, and the coverage number above moves for everyone who uses the data.
A label ships here only when the evidence survives the same forensic checks that failed to name these contracts in the first place. That is why the seven we named here are named for their architecture and their operator address rather than for a company we cannot prove is behind them.
It named eight contracts carrying $49.73M, and not one of them is reflected anywhere on this page. Attribution refreshes on the Monday sync, so these labels reach the data at the next one and the open pool above still counts all eight. We are saying so here rather than quietly publishing a page whose numbers we already know are about to move.
The eight are one fleet, not eight findings. Every member was deployed by the EOA
0xca41e7bf…cc0b and every member still returns that same address from
owner(), which is what a single operator looks like and what a per-user product
does not. The roster runs to 27 contracts with 27 distinct code hashes, because the operator
recompiles on each deployment; a bytecode-similarity sweep finds nothing and the deployer
finds everything. They are labelled Automated Trading Contract and deliberately not
MEV/Arbitrage Bot: the evidence establishes automated single-operator execution, not
arbitrage, and we do not put a word in a label that the evidence has not earned.
Two contracts the same pass examined and could not name are third and fourth in
the open pool above. 0xd0849fed… ($25.0M) is an owner-gated contract
holding twenty long-tail Base tokens with no ETH balance, deployed by a vanity address we
could not attribute. 0xf66e940d… ($22.4M) is 2,599 bytes, opaque, with no
readable selectors at all. Both stay open, and the next steps for each are written down rather
than implied.
The two contracts at the head of the pool were examined too and both survived.
0x4a8c4de8… got its first full forensic dossier on September 22, after
being passed over twice without one, and it did not break: no deployer attribution, no
funders, zero named counterparties, and an inventory of spam tokens. That path is now recorded
as exhausted for it, which is a result, just not the one we wanted.
Data: ClearTrace attribution engine, tracked Base DEX volume, 7-day window ending September 21, 2026, labels as of September 23, 2026. Attribution volume refreshes on the Monday sync, so the volume window and the label date are deliberately stated separately. Coverage percentages are volume-weighted and use our corrected classifier, which counts explicit non-identifications as unattributed. Contract observations are from public on-chain records; "unverified" means no source code is published on the chain explorer. Written by Andrew Maury, founder of ClearTrace. ClearTrace is a neutral measurement service: no venue, chain, or aggregator pays for placement in our data.